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I. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the issues that should be considered in
the drafting of a law in Bulgaria to regulate investment companies or investment
funds, also commonly known as mutual funds, investment trusts, unitary funds,
or unit trusts.' In brief, the objective of such funds is to sell their securities to the
public, and with the monies so received, invest in the securities of other compa-
nies. Each investor in a fund thus acquires an interest in the group or "pool" of
securities owned by the fund.
*The Central and East European Law Initiative (CEELI) is a public service project of the American
Bar Association designed to advance the rule of law and commercial law in the world by supporting
the law reforms underway in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States of the
former Soviet Union. Through various programs, CEELI makes available U.S. legal expertise and
assistance to emerging democracies that are in the process of modifying or restructuring their laws
or legal systems.
If you are interested in becoming involved in CEELI, contact: John C. Knechtle, Director of Legal
Assessments and Concept Papers, CEELI, 1800 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
**Prepared for CEELI by: Gerald Osheroff, Esq. (principal drafter); William H. Kleh, Esq.; Nancy
J. LaMont, Esq.; Lawrence E. McAlee, Esq.; Dean John A. Maher; David Silver, Esq.; Thomas
R. Smith, Jr., Esq.; William J. Williams, Jr., Esq.
1. For ease of reference this paper will generally use the terms "investment fund" or "fund"
to encompass all the terms by which such entities are known.
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In recent years, the popularity of investment funds as a means for the public to
participate in the securities markets has grown enormously in a number of coun-
tries. The public has come to understand that the funds enable them to share, for a
relatively modest fee, professional management of a diversified pool of securities.
Without such funds, investors would have to choose individual securities, a task
that is often difficult for the financially inexperienced, and which is made more so
in view of the competition from large institutional buyers and professional manag-
ers who often have considerably more information at their disposal. By investing
in an investment fund, the small investor gains access to a professional manager,
and spreads investment risks over the many different securities owned by the fund.
By attracting large numbers of investors into the securities markets, investment
funds not only strengthen those markets, but they promote the sense in each fund
investor of being a part of the financial or economic system rather than a non-
participating outsider. As a result, it is fair to say that investment funds are both
financially and socially useful and should be encouraged.
While it is clear that investment funds can play an important role in an economy,
in order for them to succeed it is essential that they are operated properly and
honestly. Although such an objective is no different from that of any business
undertaking, experience has shown that the nature of investment funds presents
unique problems and opportunities for dishonesty and abuse. For this reason,
regulation of investment funds is commonly more detailed and complex than laws
regulating other securities or financial enterprises. The material that follows
discusses the concerns or problems relating to investment fund operations and
the regulatory approaches to those concerns in various countries, including the
proposals of the European Community. 2
II. Types of Investment Funds3
Basically, two types of investment fund structures have developed: a contract
or "unitary" form, and a corporate form. The unitary form, which is the
2. As was noted in CEELI, A Concept Paper on Securities Regulation for Bulgaria, October 1,
1992 [reprinted in 27 INT'L LAW. 837 (1993)]: "As Bulgaria follows a civil law tradition, and as it
aspires to European Community membership, which would require eventual compliance with European
Community securities law directives, Bulgaria will wish to focus on these directives as guides. European
Community securities law is subject to certain limitations in scope and depth due to the harmonization
process by which it is formed, and is evolving. Therefore, while Bulgaria will want to comply with the
minimum requirements of current European Community law, Bulgaria should adopt a more comprehen-
sive securities law." Similarly, it is advisable that Bulgaria consider adopting an investment fund law
that is more comprehensive than what may be required under the European Community standards.
3. The working group for this concept paper wishes to acknowledge a member of the group,
David Silver, formerly president of The Investment Company Institute, for his paper, Meeting the
Demand for Pooled Investments in a World Market, September 24, 1991, which is the source of
much of the material herein relating to operation of investment funds outside the United States.
Acknowledgement is also given to David Reed and Andrew Ballheimer for their article The Legal
Framework of the Securities Industry in the European Community Under the 1992 Program, 29
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required structure for German and British funds, as well as for funds in certain
other countries, is created by the fund's sponsor-manager and is a contractual
arrangement between the sponsor-manager and investors. Under that arrange-
ment the fund does not have an independent existence. Investors in a unitary
fund purchase units and have no voting rights concerning the way the fund
is operated. The corporate form, required in the United States, has a separate
existence from that of its manager, and is owned by its shareholders, like any
corporation. Under the law, shareholders are given certain voting powers,
including approval of the manager's agreement with the fund, and the election
of the board of directors.4 In France, both the corporate and unitary forms
of investment fund are permitted.
Under the corporate form, the shareholders and/or the directors have the power
to dismiss the manager5 and any other providers of services to the fund. Dismissal
of the manager is unusual, however, absent serious breaches of duty. If the
independent directors recognize conduct by the manager that is believed contrary
to the fund's interest, their "fiduciary" obligations, that is, the duties imposed
upon them by their positions of trust, require them to take appropriate action to
ensure that the fund is not harmed. In serious cases, the government regulator
(the SEC, in the United States) will be heavily involved, and may impose any of
a variety of penalties, up to and including banning the manager from the fund
industry. Only rarely have shareholders and/or directors removed investment
managers because of disappointment with fund investment performance.
In the unitary system, an independent trustee or depositary (custodian) and the
government regulator play a role in monitoring the manager's activities. The
initial responsibility for discipline of the manager lies with the manager itself.
The independent trustee or depositary monitors or oversees the actions taken, and
to the extent of its authority, may take corrective action. Under both the unitary
and corporate systems, the government regulator can step in at any time and take
whatever action it considers appropriate under the law.
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 103 (1991), for material therein pertaining to the
European Community Directive concerning "undertakings for collective investments in transferable
securities" (the "UCITS Directive").
4. The United States investment company law requires that a fund's board of directors include
a percentage of members with no interest in or affiliation with the manager, in order to provide a
degree of director independence from the manager. In practice, funds commonly maintain boards
with a majority of independent directors. Although independent directors receive payments from the
manager for their board service, there has been little if any evidence or experience that their indepen-
dence has been compromised, or weakened, by those payments. The United States Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), the governmental regulatory body, has the authority to make a
finding that the payments to a director are so significant, or "material," that the director should not
be considered independent.
5. The term "manager" as used refers to the entity responsible for selecting the fund's invest-
ments (the "investment adviser") as well as operating the fund. The terms manager, adviser, invest-
ment manager, and investment adviser are generally used interchangeably herein. Where more than
one organization is involved, they are ordinarily closely related.
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Under the UCITS Directive, a UCITS from one European Community Member
State that is properly authorized by that State (its "Home State") may sell its
securities in any other Member State, subject to marketing, advertising, and tax
laws of the other State (the "Host State"). The UCITS Directive covers only
"open-end" UCITS, both the unitary and corporate form.6
III. Particular Problems or Concerns of Investment Funds
Any company, including an investment fund, that proposes to sell securities to
the public must provide sufficient information about the company and its opera-
tions, or "full disclosure," to allow investors to make an informed investment
decision. Experience has shown, however, that a disclosure requirement alone is
not adequate to protect fund investors. As noted previously, investment funds
present unique opportunities for abuse and dishonesty, and, therefore, they war-
rant more extensive regulation than is customary under securities law. In the
United States, the investment fund history and experience of several decades led
to the enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940, a statute that provides
comprehensive regulation of funds. It is instructive to note that, while there have
been a number of amendments in the intervening fifty years since its enactment,
the Investment Company Act remains substantially intact as to its core, or major,
provisions. That fact indicates the belief of regulators that the opportunities for
investment fund abuse that were uncovered prior to 1940 remain today.
The special problems presented by investment funds arise in large part from
the nature of their assets: pools of securities, often highly negotiable or "liquid."
Unlike the assets of operating businesses, which may consist of factories, machin-
ery, and merchandise, a fund's only assets are its securities (and currency), which
can be easily stolen without proper safeguards. As a result, and as discussed later
in this paper, it is essential to ensure that the method of custody of fund assets
eliminates to the extent possible the opportunities for such misconduct.
While theft of fund securities is perhaps the most easily understood type of
misconduct, without effective regulation persons who control an investment
fund-its management or "insiders' '-may employ less obvious methods to use
the fund more for their benefit than for the welfare of their investors. As examples:
" The prices of fund securities charged to "insiders" (those in a position of
power or influence over a fund) might be less than the prices to the public.
Similar unfair pricing practices could exist when fund securities holders
"redeem," or sell, their fund securities to the fund.
* Insiders might sell to the fund at excessive prices securities they own (other
than the securities issued by the fund) for use in the fund's portfolio of
investments, or could purchase securities owned by the fund at less than their
value.
6. Open-end funds must redeem their securities at net asset value. See note 8 below.
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" Fund managers could charge unfair fees for various services to the fund.
" Funds might issue securities of different types or classes whose provisions,
rights, or privileges could affect each other, the result being a capital struc-
ture too complex for investors to understand.
* Investors in a fund may fail to receive adequate and accurate information
concerning the investment policies or objectives of the fund, including timely
information when those policies or objectives are changed.
* Advertisements for funds may attempt to influence potential investors with
insufficient or false or misleading information.
* The prices of fund securities to the public could be incorrect because of
erroneous valuations of the fund's assets; in that case, investors would pay
too much or too little for their investments in the fund.7
While the above concerns relate mainly to the manner in which management
operates a fund, the regulatory authorities must also decide what approach to take
on a number of other important issues including the following:
* Should fund managers be required to meet certain qualification standards,
commonly referred to as "merit regulation"?
a Do all investment funds require regulation, or should certain funds be ex-
empted?
* How frequently should "open-end" funds be required to redeem securities?
0 How should investment funds be taxed?
While many concerns and problem areas are listed above (and further discussed
below), it is difficult, if not impossible, to include every conceivable regulatory
issue. Furthermore, regulation is continuously changing, because experience has
shown that over time, particularly as investment funds grow in number and
variety, new issues continuously present themselves. Moreover, as a practical
matter, it would be difficult for the drafters of a new statute dealing with a fund
industry in its infancy to attempt to cover every conceivable aspect of regulation.
To do so would be unnecessarily complex and time-consuming. It is more im-
portant that a system of regulation be in place as soon as possible to deal with a
number of basic, clearly definable problems. Otherwise, an investment fund
7. Investors redeeming their fund units would similarly receive too little or too much for their
investments. Incorrect valuation of assets often results from negligent or unqualified personnel rather
than from intentional acts. Whatever the reason, management and regulators must do all that is possible
to assure proper valuation, because without it public confidence in investment funds is not possible.
8. Investment funds can be the "open-end" or the "closed-end" type. An open-end fund issues
"redeemable" securities; that is, the fund must repurchase its securities from any owner of its
securities who offers them to the fund. A closed-end fund has no such obligation, and its securities
trade on the market, like the securities of any company. The European Community's UCITS Directive
(see note 3 above) states that UCITS securities must be redeemable, and portfolio securities (the
securities that comprise the fund assets) must be liquid. (Liquid securities are those that can be readily
traded on the market. Securities that have a "thin" market, that is, a small trading volume, are not
considered liquid. The prices of such securities tend to display "volatility"; that is, they tend to move
up or down quickly, and often significantly.)
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industry could emerge without regulatory guidance, other than a general securities
law, assuming such has been adopted. 9 As time passes, the regulatory authority
can determine from experience what amendments to the statute are needed or
desirable.' It is suggested that a statute proposing to regulate investment funds
in Bulgaria should initially consider at least the following categories of issues:"
a. valuation of portfolio securities in connection with sale and redemption of
fund securities;
b. requirements as to custody of fund assets;
c. dealings of the fund with insiders or "affiliates";
d. regulation of the fund manager's fees;
e. disclosure and information relating to the fund for potential and existing
fund investors;
f. limitations as to capital structure, particularly classes of securities.
What follows is a discussion of these issues and the approach to them in various
countries and the European Community or "EC."
IV. Approaches to Investment Fund Regulation
A. VALUATION OF PORTFOLIO SECURITIES IN CONNECTION WITH SALE AND
REDEMPTION OF FUND SECURITIES
The type of fund known as the open-end fund is required to redeem its securities
upon the request of an investor. Open-end funds also normally offer their securities
continuously to the public. If they did not do so, their obligation to redeem their
securities upon demand would cause fund assets to diminish and eventually be
depleted. However, it is the requirement to redeem that establishes the fund's
type. The price of a share or unit of such a fund for both sales and redemptions
9. While a general securities law would provide requirements for all companies that offer
securities to the public, it would not, as noted, deal with the numerous other investment fund issues.
One approach the authorities might consider is the immediate adoption of a policy, by law or regulation,
that no investment funds may operate until the enactment of a statute specifically regulating such
undertakings. As an alternative, investment funds formed prior to enactment of a specific fund statute
could be required to comply with such a law when it takes effect. Of course, the latter approach could
result in serious fund problems arising prior to the existence of statutory means to deal with them.
10. The drafters of a statute regulating investment funds may wish to consider a provision that
allows the regulatory authority to issue rules that are necessary or appropriate in the exercise of its
powers under the statute. Including this rule-making authority in the statute would allow the regulator
to benefit from experience and adapt to changing circumstances without continuously seeking formal
statutory change. At the same time, care must be taken that rule-making authority is not given or used
so broadly as to defeat the intent of statutory provisions. Any such fundamental changes should be
accomplished only by statutory amendment. If the statute does provide for rule-making authority, one
possible safeguard could be to require that any rule proposal must be made public, so that affected
parties, such as fund managers or fund security holders, could offer comments to the regulatory
authority. After consideration of such comments, the regulatory authority would determine whether
the rule proposal should be adopted as proposed, or modified, or even withdrawn.
11. A decision as to the form that funds should take, that is, corporate or unitary (or both), is
also needed. Those forms have been described at some length above.
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depends directly on "net asset value." In essence, net asset value refers to the
value of the fund's assets (essentially its portfolio securities and currency) minus
any liabilities. Net asset value per share or per unit refers to the figure resulting
or derived by dividing the fund's aggregate, or total, net asset value by the number
of shares or units outstanding. As noted previously, accurate pricing of open-end
funds' portfolio securities in connection with sales and redemptions of fund securi-
ties is essential for public confidence, without which a fund industry will not long
survive. 
2
In theory, pricing should not present too difficult a problem. Securities have
market prices; and fund liabilities, which should normally be minimal, can be
handled under generally accepted accounting principles. However, a fund located
in a country that does not yet have developed securities exchanges and/or markets
faces asset valuation problems that can be considerably more difficult than in
places where there are thousands of different securities being traded, and where
price quotations are generally easily obtainable. In a country with relatively few
securities being traded, and/or with securities being "thinly" traded, relatively
minor trading may cause prices to fluctuate significantly. Under those circum-
stances, it may be difficult to determine at any given time an accurate value of
a fund's portfolio of assets. In view of this situation, the government may initially
wish to consider whether it should delay authorizing the operation of investment
funds until the securities market has reached a certain level of strength and diversi-
fication.
Another possible approach to the problem of thin securities markets and limited
liquidity is to lengthen the intervals between required redemptions. Presently in
the United States, a fund is required to price its shares (by valuing its assets) on
any day it receives a request for redemption, or a purchase order. 13 The Investment
Company Act also provides that when a holder of fund shares offers his shares
12. Accurate valuation of the assets of a closed-end fund is also important, particularly during
any period when the fund is selling its securities to the public. However, previously issued and
outstanding securities of this type of fund are not redeemed by the fund, but are traded on securities
markets. Therefore, those prices are set by market forces. United States experience demonstrates that
the securities of closed-end funds rarely trade at their net asset value. They more frequently have
traded at prices below that value, although securities of some funds at times have traded at a premium.
13. Under United States requirements, the price the investor receives or pays is a "forward"
price, that is, the price next calculated after the fund receives the redemption or sale request. The
requirement for forward pricing as opposed to a "backward" price, that is, a price based on the
previous valuation of the fund's assets, assures that an investor will not receive or pay a price that
currently does not reflect true asset value because of intervening market changes. Prior to the forward
pricing requirement it was not uncommon for insiders, with their access to information relating to
fund assets, to take advantage of changes in portfolio values. Upon learning that the value of the fund's
assets had risen, they would place an order for fund securities at the previous price. Dilution of the
fund's assets resulted because the price paid for the securities issued by the fund was less than the
asset value at the time of sale. As a result, the existing fund security holders experienced a decline
in the value of their securities. A similar result occurred under backward pricing whenever a fund
redeemed its securities at a price greater than the current asset value. In that case, the redeeming
security holders would benefit at the expense of all other security holders.
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to the fund for redemption, he must receive payment within seven business days.
Recently it has been proposed in the United States to allow a fund as much as one
month to pay the proceeds of a redemption request. That proposal would permit
an open-end fund to invest in securities of lower liquidity than is allowed under
the present redemption requirement, because it could sell investments more gradu-
ally to meet redemption requests. As a result, the market impact of such sales
would be lessened. 14 If investment funds should begin operating in Bulgaria before
broad markets exist, it might be sensible to consider a similar policy.
In France, fund shares must be repurchased when a holder makes a request
although, under certain extraordinary circumstances, that right may be sus-
pended.' 5 The fund also must cease repurchase of its shares if the value of its
assets falls below a minimum figure set by statute.
In Germany, the bank custodian of a fund's assets, with the assistance of the
fund management company, calculates prices for sale and redemption. The prices
are based on asset value and are calculated each day that the stock exchange does
business. The value of a fund portfolio security is either the official daily exchange
fixed price for a security traded on the exchange, or is based on market price.
The monies paid by an investor for fund securities must be transferred immediately
to the fund, although the time of payment for redemptions is normally provided
by the contract between the manager and investors.'6
In the United Kingdom, a unit trust manager must issue or redeem units at least
twice monthly. 17 Prices may be either forward or "historic," that is, backward.
But the manager must choose one method and disclose it in the fund documents
given to investors. However, if valuations are made more than one business day
apart, or if the manager believes that net asset value has moved more than two
per cent since the last valuation, historic price may not be used.
The European Community's UCITS Directive requires UCITS to repurchase
or redeem units upon a unitholder's request. That right can be suspended only in
exceptional cases. The method of valuation of UCITS assets for sale and redemp-
tion must be provided by law or fund rules or, if applicable, instruments of
incorporation. There is no express provision for either forward or historic pricing.
UCITS must make prices public at time of sale or repurchase, and prices must
be published at least twice a month. However, there is no express provision
prohibiting redemptions at intervals longer than twice a month.
14. Under that proposal (which the SEC may decide to modify) a fund would still have to price
its securities on any day it received a purchase order. Of course, a fund could decide not to offer its
shares continuously, in order to avoid the daily pricing requirement. Bulgarian funds could determine
to sell their shares at stated intervals and price only on the dates of sale. Such a policy would appear
sensible where markets are thin.
15. A provision in United States law similarly allows suspension of redemptions under limited,
extraordinary situations.
16. As noted earlier, in the unitary type of investment fund, required in Germany and a number
of other countries, a contract exists between manager and investor.
17. The unit trust is the form of fund marketed publicly in the United Kingdom.
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B. REQUIREMENTS AS TO CUSTODY OF FUND ASSETS
In the United States, virtually every fund employs a bank as custodian of its
assets. Although the Investment Company Act also permits self-custody or cus-
tody with a broker/dealer, the SEC has imposed requirements that make it difficult
or impractical to use other than a bank custodian.' The SEC has also stated that
the custodian bank may not be an affiliate of the fund's investment adviser/
manager.' 9 The custodianship agreement requires the fund to send the custodian
bank the names (and signatures) of those persons authorized to direct the bank
to settle portfolio securities transactions and to pay out the fund's money. The
custodian should not pay out money until it has received securities, or deliver
securities until it has received money. The fund must keep its money, as well as
its portfolio securities, with its custodian. A fund may have more than one custo-
dian and there may be sub-custodians so long as all custodial safeguards are
fulfilled.
An investment fund in France must keep its assets with a custodian or "deposi-
tary" that is "unique and distinct" from the fund. The Minister of the Economy
maintains an approved list from which the fund must select its depositary. The
depositary must take "appropriate measures to assure the safety of... transac-
tions." Although the depositary may allow third parties to hold fund assets, the
depositary's duty with respect to those assets is unchanged.
In Germany, the Federal Banking Supervisory Authority must approve any
custodian bank holding fund assets. An approved bank can be a German bank or
a branch in Germany of a bank from another EC member state. The directors and
officers of the custodian may not be employees of the fund management company;
nor may directors and officers of the management company be employees of the
bank. The custodian bank must act in the interest of investors. If the management
company instructs the bank to perform actions contrary to the fund's contract with
the bank, the bank must refuse to carry out those instructions.
In the United Kingdom, a fund must keep its assets under custody and control
of a trustee, incorporated in an EC member state, authorized under the Financial
Services Act, and independent from the manager. The trustee may appoint sub-
custodians, subject to certain regulatory conditions.
The UCITS Directive requires that UCITS assets must be entrusted to a deposi-
tary for safe-keeping. No single company may act as depositary and fund manage-
ment company. A depositary for a unitary or contract form of UCITS also must
18. Many American Investment Company Act experts consider the self-custody provisions to be
a deficiency in the Act, and believe that custody should always be in the hands of a third party.
19. In such a situation, the custody would be considered as self-custody. Under United States
law, the term "affiliate" refers generally to someone in a position of power or control, whether
through official position or stock ownership. An affiliate may be a person or a company. Occasionally,
this paper uses the term "affiliate" in connection with non-United States funds to indicate generally
persons or entities with influential relationships with the fund. See also note 20.
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determine unit value and carry out the manager's instructions unless contrary to
law or the fund's rules. The depositary must be subject to "public control" and
its registered office must be in the same Member State as the management com-
pany (or the investment company, if the fund is the corporate form). The deposi-
tary is liable for losses if it does not exercise a reasonable standard of care.
C. DEALINGS OF THE FUND WITH INSIDERS OR AFFILIATES
In the United States, limitations on the ability of insiders, or "affiliates," to
engage in transactions with the fund are considered to be at the heart of the
Investment Company Act. 20 Although certain revisions have been adopted over
the more than 50 years of the statute's existence, the basic restrictions remain in
place.21 Under the Act, insiders are prohibited from selling securities or property
to the fund, and from purchasing securities or property from the fund.22 These
restrictions recognize the potential for insiders to use their power over the fund
to sell or purchase assets at unfair prices.23 It should be noted that under this
restriction, an affiliated broker/dealer may not sell securities as a "principal" to
the fund, that is, securities that the broker/dealer owns, or purchase securities
from the fund. An affiliated broker/dealer can, however, receive "customary"
commissions, or fees, from the fund for brokerage transactions. Also prohibited
by the statute are loans from the fund to its affiliates. The statute prohibits, as
well, an affiliate from engaging in a "joint transaction" with the fund. That
prohibition recognizes the danger of an affiliate using the assets of the fund
unfairly in a joint venture or arrangement.'
Other jurisdictions with investment funds generally also place limitations on
fund transactions with related persons. But the extent of those prohibitions in the
United States exceeds what most regulation elsewhere imposes. Nonetheless, it
20. Under the Investment Company Act, an affiliate (or "affiliated person") of a company
includes its directors, officers, the investment adviser, any person owning five per cent or more of
the company's voting securities, and any person "directly or indirectly" controlling the company.
("Person" can refer to an individual or a company.)
21. While the United States Investment Company Act severely restricts affiliated (and various
other) transactions, it is important to remember that the statute also includes provisions permitting
the SEC, the regulatory authority, to exempt transactions, upon written application. The application
must establish that the proposed transaction is fair, and is consistent with the interest of investors,
the fund, and the statute. The SEC must give public notice of any exemptive application prior to
granting it, and must give "interested" persons the opportunity to object.
22. Normally, a fund will have little or any "property" other than its portfolio securities and
currency on hand.
23. This discussion does not relate to the prices of securities that the fund itself issues. The price
at which those securities must be sold and redeemed by the fund depend upon their net asset value,
as previously discussed, and are covered by other provisions of the Investment Company Act. Affiliates
may purchase securities issued by their fund, and redeem those securities, like any other investors.
24. A general prohibition also exists against a securities underwriter affiliated with the fund
selling to the fund any security during the time the underwriting group is offering the security for
sale. The obvious danger in such a situation is that the underwriter/insider may be tempted to "dump"
into the fund's portfolio a security that is proving difficult to sell.
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is undeniable that the prohibitions on dealings by or with affiliates have played
an enormous role in maintaining the honesty of United States fund operations and
public confidence in the funds.25
In France, the depositary (custodian) and the management company must act
for the sole benefit of the fund investors. One of the depositary's duties is to
ensure that the fund's transactions are in accordance with the law. Under French
law, the depositary and management company must take "appropriate measures
to assure the safety of their transactions." French law places percentage limits
on a fund's acquisition of certain pools of securities where a controlling entity of
its management company transfers the assets to the pool.
Under German regulation, a German fund may not purchase assets from, or
sell assets to, members of the executive and supervisory boards of its management
company. There is, however, no direct regulation against transactions with related
parties, such as shareholders of the management company. In Germany, these
shareholders are commonly banks, the major securities traders. The management
company is held to the general standard of "the diligence of ordinary business-
man" for any such transaction with a related bank or other party. In addition,
purchases above market prices and sales below market prices are prohibited.
Germany has also adopted for its own funds (with certain exceptions) restrictions
contained in the UCITS Directive against a fund's purchases of securities of
another fund managed by the same management company or by a management
company with certain connections to the first fund's management company.
26
Regulations in the United Kingdom do prohibit certain transactions or services
between the fund manager or trustee (or their affiliates) and the fund. Exemptions
are available where the proper price or value of the asset may be independently
determined, or the best available deal is obtained (where the asset is exchange
traded), or where the deal meets certain principles of fairness by satisfying what
is often referred to as "arm's-length" standards. 27 Brokerage transactions with
affiliates that meet standards of fairness are permitted. United Kingdom regula-
tions do not address joint transactions. United Kingdom funds may not engage
in lending.
While the UCITS Directive does contain a number of requirements pertaining
to UCITS operations including qualifications of directors, investment advisers,
25. The SEC has used its exemptive authority frequently to permit transactions with affiliates that
are shown to offer no problems.
26. Under United States law, purchases by an investment company of shares of other investment
companies are significantly restricted. The reasoning behind that policy is the fear that an investor
would not only pay the various fees, charges, and expenses of the investor's direct fund investment,
but would indirectly pay similar charges of the funds in which the first fund was investing. It is also
believed that the benefits of one fund investing in other funds are questionable, and generally do not
outweigh the disadvantages.
27. An "arm's-length" transaction refers to a situation where the parties reach an agreement that
is fair by objective standards, and is not influenced by the relationship of the parties. One way to
achieve such a result is to retain independent experts to determine value.
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and custodians, there are no provisions expressly regulating transactions and
possible conflicts of interest between a fund and its manager, other affiliated
parties, or its custodian.
D. REGULATION OF THE FUND MANAGER'S FEES
In the United States, the Investment Company Act imposes a "fiduciary duty"
upon a fund's investment adviser, that is a duty of trust and faith, with respect
to the amount of payments or fees paid to the adviser. A fund security holder as
well as the SEC may bring a legal action against the adviser claiming that amounts
paid to it were excessive. It should be noted that the law does not apply only to
the amounts received for advisory services, that is, the selection of the fund's
investments; rather, the amounts received by the adviser (or its controlled compa-
nies) for any non-advisory services may also be included for purposes of an
excessive payment determination. The excessive fee provision applies even
though the law also requires the adviser to receive the approval of the fund's
independent directors and shareholders before it can receive payments under a
new advisory contract. In addition, after an advisory contract has been in effect
for two years, the law requires the directors or the shareholders to re-approve it
annually.25 The adoption of the excessive fee provision in the statute arises from
its underlying philosophy that there is a potential conflict between the manager
and the fund as to fee levels, which is not solved by the required shareholder and
director approvals of advisory fee contracts. Therefore, the statute should provide
a remedy to the fund and its shareholders. Although all fees and charges are
required to be clearly stated in fund prospectuses, full disclosure has never been
considered a solution for conflict issues and other problems of substance that
relate to investment companies.
French law does not place any limits on fees paid to the sponsor/manager by
French funds.
Similarly, German law does not provide limitations on the amount of charges
that a fund may pay from its assets. The philosophy, which is the general approach
in those jurisdictions where the unitary or non-corporate form of fund prevails,
is that the amount of charges is a pricing issue which can best be decided in the
marketplace. The contract conditions, which are a part of the prospectus, and the
purchase application must clearly disclose all charges.
In the United Kingdom, the regulations allow a periodic charge against a fund's
assets for management compensation. The regulations require that the trust deed
authorize the charge, state the maximum rate, and specify the method of calcula-
28. Court cases alleging excessive fees have been notably unsuccessful. One reason is undoubtedly
the relatively low fee structure in the United States fund industry. Certainly the existence of the
fiduciary standard in the statute has played an important role in restraining fees, although the intense
competition among funds to attract shareholders with lower costs has also played a part, particularly
in recent years.
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tion. The requirement that funds present this information in a uniform manner is
intended to enable investors to compare fee structures of different funds. The
Financial Services Act specifically prohibits regulations from setting any maxi-
mum fee level. While the trust deed states the maximum charge (two per cent is
common), the prospectus-like document called the "scheme particulars" may
specify a lower percentage. However, the fund manager can itself increase the
level of charges up to the stated maximum upon notice to investors. The increased
charges take effect from 90 days after revised scheme particulars are published.
Any amendment of the maximum fee rate in the trust deed requires the approval
of investors with 75 per cent of fund units.
The UCITS Directive does not specifically set maximum fee rates. However,
it does provide that the law or fund rules must set forth the compensation and
expenses that an investment adviser may charge, and the method of calculating
those payments. There is no limitation as to management fee structure. It would
appear that an "incentive" fee as well as an all inclusive type is permissible.29
E. DIscLoSURE AND INFORMATION RELATING TO THE FUND FOR POTENTIAL
AND EXISTING FUND INVESTORS
Investors or potential investors in an investment fund should receive correct,
current, and adequate information about the fund. In this respect, investment
funds are no different from any company that has sold or proposes to sell its
securities to the public. In general, therefore, many of the information require-
ments of securities laws apply equally to investment funds. ° But, as indicated
previously, investment funds present a number of issues which differentiate them
from other undertakings.
One matter that requires special consideration is advertising. Unlike other
companies, it is common for funds that issue redeemable securities to offer their
securities continuously to the public. In addition, the only "product" sold by an
investment fund is its securities. Whereas industrial companies, such as automo-
bile or clothing manufacturers, are generally free to advertise what they sell, an
advertisement by an investment fund of its "product" is really an effort to sell
its securities. As such, it is essential that fund advertisements do not contain
29. Under an incentive fee, the adviser's payments depend directly on the fund's performance.
In other words, if the fund's portfolio rises in value, the adviser shares, often substantially, in the
gains. This type of structure is in contrast to an all inclusive manager's fee, or to an advisory fee as
a fixed percentage of fund assets. Of course, even in the fixed percentage fee situation, an increase
in value in the fund assets will result in greater fees to the adviser. However, the percentage of the
fee to total assets remains constant. Also, a decrease in value of fund assets will cause a proportionate
decrease in fees. With certain exceptions, incentive fees for fund managers in the United States are
not permitted. That prohibition arose mainly from experience with fund managers taking undue risks
with fund assets in hopes of realizing substantial gains, and, therefore, substantial advisory fees. The
result frequently was that the fund suffered substantial losses resulting from the adviser's speculation.
30. See A Concept Paper on Securities Regulation for Bulgaria, especially the material therein
under Disclosure Regulation.
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misleading information. Another advertising issue is whether to allow readers of
a fund advertisement to purchase securities on the basis of the advertisement
before receipt of a formal prospectus (the practice in a number of European
countries) or whether the advertisement should serve only as a means for the
potential investor to send for a prospectus (the United States practice).3' In addi-
tion, if sales are allowed from the advertisement, the specific information it should
contain must also be determined.32 Since advertising is outside the areas covered
under the UCITS Directive, it will be necessary for UCITS to comply with the
advertising requirements of the Host State.
Clear disclosure of an investment fund's investment policies and objectives is
essential for investors. They must be able to understand the types of securities
the fund intends to invest in, its goals in making those investments, and whatever
risks may result. It is important for the potential investor to understand policies
and objectives and equally important for the existing investor to be aware of any
changes proposed by the investment manager. A number of jurisdictions require
approval of security holders before management may change certain policies.
In the United States, when a fund registers with the SEC, it must set forth its
investment policies and a number of other "fundamental" policies, that is, those
that cannot be changed without a vote of its security holders. Among these are
whether it will have a "diversified" portfolio, and whether its investments will
be concentrated in a particular industry.33 As is true for public sale in the United
States of any securities, the buyer of fund shares, if not already in possession of
a current prospectus, must receive one before or at the time of investment. The
prospectus must contain information as to policies, objectives, fees, past perfor-
mance, and other matters. Funds also are required to keep their investors informed
of material information on a regular basis and must send them semi-annual finan-
cial statements.
In France, among the materials a fund must file with the Commission des
Operations de Bourse ("COB") when making a public offering of its securities
is a description of its investment objectives. The fund must describe its objectives
in any selling document for its securities, and also in periodic reports, required
31. The type ofinformation required in a prospectus is normally determined by the fund regulatory
authority.
32. In the United States, the SEC staff has recently recommended statutory changes that would
allow sales to be made from advertisements, prior to receipt of a prospectus. The advertisement
would be required to contain information such as fees and expenses, the fund's performance record,
investment objectives, and investment risks. Furthermore, the fund would still be required to deliver
a formal, or statutory, prospectus. Also the advertisement, to the same degree as the formal prospectus,
would be subject to liabilities for misstatements.
33. Under United States law, a "diversified" fund refers to one that (except for 25% of its assets)
does not have more than 5 % of its assets in securities of a single issuer. It is noteworthy that, in the
United States, a fund's investment objectives or the types of securities it may invest in are not
"fundamental" matters requiring a shareholder vote. Of course, the manager has the obligation under
general securities law principles to disclose changes in those matters.
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under law annually as well as semi-annually or quarterly. The reports must also
describe certain financial and other information.
German funds must set forth investment policies and objectives in the conditions
of contract between the manager and investors, and the prospectus must explain
the policies and objectives. Any changes must be approved by the Federal Banking
Supervisory Authority. Changes in policies and objectives usually do not take
effect for three months, which enables investors who disapprove of the changes
to redeem their investment. German law contains a number of investment restric-
tions for German funds, in accordance with the UCITS Directive. Also, German
funds must issue and keep current a prospectus containing all material information
relating to the evaluation of fund securities. In addition to policies and objectives,
this requirement includes, among other things, information on management and
the custodian, issuance and redemption of securities, and tax regulations. Also,
the funds must publish annual and semi-annual reports and make them available
free of charge to investors.
In the United Kingdom, the scheme particulars (the prospectus-like document)
must set forth the investment objective and policies of the fund. The trust deed
(a basic document of the fund) must contain any investment restrictions relating
to geographic areas or economic sectors. Unitholders must approve, at a general
meeting, any changes to the above. (Trust deed changes require at least a 75 per
cent vote of unitholders participating.) Fund managers must also comply with a
number of regulations relating to investments, derived from the UCITS Directive.
Generally, the disclosure system in the United Kingdom under its Financial Ser-
vices Act is similar to that in the United States. The scheme particulars must be
kept current and amended at least annually. Unlike in the United States, the
scheme particulars do not have to be delivered, but must be offered to an investor
before purchase. In practice, scheme particulars are often not requested by invest-
ors, who may purchase on the basis of advertisements. If an advertisement is the
type inviting purchase, it is required to disclose a number of items of importance.
The UCITS Directive contains detailed requirements concerning UCITS invest-
ment policies. With limited exceptions, a fund's investments must consist of
transferable (liquid) securities admitted to listing on a Member State stock ex-
change or traded on another regulated exchange. A UCITS generally may not
invest more than five per cent of its assets in transferable securities of a single
issuer (company). UCITS may acquire securities of other UCITS that are gov-
erned by the UCITS Directive.3 A UCITS may generally not acquire voting
securities of any issuer that give the UCITS or its manager "significant influence"
over the management of that issuer.
A UCITS must publish a prospectus (which must be kept current) as well as
prescribed periodic reports. The prospectus must enable investors to make an
34. But see note 26 concerning investments by a fund in other funds.
SPRING 1994
252 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
informed judgment of the investment.35 The annual report must contain audited
financial statements and other information. 3 6 There is no requirement for delivery
of any documents prior to or at time of purchase of the fund's securities. However,
the prospectus and the latest reports must be offered without cost before the
contract is concluded. The fund's periodic reports must be available to existing
fund security holders, at specified locations, without cost. The reports must be
supplied without charge to security holders who request them.
F. LIMITATIONS AS TO. CAPITAL STRUCTURE, PARTICULARLY CLASSES OF
SECURITIES
As a general rule, it is extremely important that a fund's capital structure be
kept simple. The most simple structure would be a single class of securities, which
means that each investor has the same rights, and is getting exactly the same type
of interest as every other investor. When a fund is allowed to issue different
classes of securities, the rights and privileges of each are often difficult for
investors to understand. Furthermore, the classes may have competing and/or
unfair provisions. While fund borrowings result in the issuance of a type of debt
security, they are generally allowed. However, it is the general practice for fund
regulation to restrict severely the extent of fund borrowings.
Funds in the United States may issue one class of redeemable common shares
with equal voting rights. The issuance of "senior securities" (debt and preferred
stock) is prohibited except that a fund may borrow from banks. Immediately after
the borrowing the fund must have a 300 per cent asset coverage.37
France permits its funds to issue only one class of shares, essentially non-voting.
Thus, shareholders in French funds have no control over management. A fund
may borrow up to 10 per cent of its assets.
Germany allows its funds to issue only a single class of certificates, each
representing an equal share of fund assets. Borrowings are limited to the UCITS
Directive requirements, that is, up to 10% of assets and on a temporary basis.
In the United Kingdom, the permitted capital structure is similar to that in the
United States. Borrowing is limited to 10 per cent of fund assets, and, essentially,
may be only for temporary purposes.
It is not clear whether the UCITS Directive permits the issuance of more than
one class of security. Borrowing, as previously noted, is substantially limited and
must be temporary.
35. The prospectus must contain at a minimum the information provided for in Schedule A of
the UCITS Directive.
36. Required information is set forth in Schedule B of the UCITS Directive.
37. Thus, for example, a fund with $2 million in assets could borrow $1 million from a bank or
banks. After the borrowing, the fund would have $3 million in assets and $1 million in borrowings,
a three to one ratio and, therefore, a 300% asset coverage.
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V. Other Regulatory Matters
The Bulgarian regulatory authorities should also consider how they wish to
approach the following issues.
A. MERIT REGULATION OF FUND MANAGERS
Regulation of the competence or qualifications of fund managers, often referred
to as "merit" regulation, is not included in United States law. Although invest-
ment advisers must register with the SEC, there are no requirements under the
law as to education, training, or experience. Only a history of dishonesty or
criminal behavior in securities related matters will disqualify a person from serv-
ing as an investment adviser.38
In contrast, merit regulation of fund managers is much more common in Eu-
rope, and may well become universal in view of the UCITS Directive which
requires local regulators to pass upon the qualifications of investment managers.
B. EXEMPTION OF CERTAIN FUNDS FROM REGULATION
Regulatory authorities may wish to consider if the investment fund statute
should exempt certain categories of funds from regulation in whole or in part. In
the United States, for example, the Investment Company Act expressly provides,
in effect, that funds that do not attempt to make a public offering, and do not have
more than 100 security holders, are not regulated as investment funds under the
statute. The idea behind this provision is that it is impractical to attempt to regulate
every private investment company, such as groups with family or other close
personal relationships. Of course, a danger exists that some promoters or manag-
ers will try to use such an exemption in situations where it is not warranted. 9
C. TAXATION
The approach to taxation of investment funds must also be considered. As a
general matter, every country where investment funds are sold tries to put fund
investors in the same tax position as if they owned fund portfolio securities
38. Such behavior also disqualifies anyone from serving as employee, officer, director, or under-
writer of an investment company.
39. Another consideration is whether to exempt funds that offer their securities only to individuals
or entities that are financially sophisticated and/or possess significant financial resources. The basis
for that approach would be that such persons themselves possess the necessary knowledge and experi-
ence to judge the merits of fund securities. While this approach has not yet been adopted in the United
States, it is presently being given serious thought. It is, however, probably wise to defer consideration
of this type of exemption until the fund industry has reached a relatively mature condition. It should
be stressed that any funds exempted from the specific fund regulatory statute because of the limited
number of investors and/or their financial sophistication should nonetheless remain subject to general
securities law anti-fraud provisions that prohibit material misstatements or omissions in connection
with the sale of securities.
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directly. If there were a double tax, that is, on both the fund and the investor,
investment in funds would be discouraged. Accordingly, every country with a
fund industry has enacted tax provisions that recognize the unique nature of
investment funds.
In the United States, as a general matter, if a fund distributes annually substan-
tially all of its income and realized capital gains to its shareholders, it is entitled
to so-called flow-through tax treatment. By that, it is meant that the fund share-
holders pay taxes on those amounts, while the fund does not. Although some
European countries do not go quite so far as the United States, others, such as
Germany, virtually ignore the fund as a separate entity for tax purposes. It is
worth emphasizing once more that the goal of all countries with funds is fair tax
treatment of fund investors, without which the industry would be unlikely to thrive
or even survive.
D. CLOSED-END FUNDS
Unlike an open-end fund, a closed-end fund does not issue redeemable securi-
ties. Instead, its securities are traded on the market, like any other company. (See
note 8 above.) While the UCITS Directive (notes 3 and 8 above) requires UCITS
securities to be redeemable, closed-end funds could exist within Bulgaria, absent
specific statutory prohibition. If closed-end funds, whose purpose is investing in
securities, are permitted, then they, like open-end funds, would warrant compre-
hensive regulation. 40
However, there may also develop a type of company whose status is less easy
to define, but which has some of the characteristics of a closed-end fund, and
therefore, raises some of the same concerns. This type of entity would be a limited
liability company, publicly owned, with a large part of its assets consisting of
"investment securities." Such a company should be made subject under the
investment funds statute to special requirements or regulation in addition to those
applicable to companies engaged in ordinary trade or commerce. For this purpose,
investment securities may be understood to include all securities except securities
of majority-owned subsidiaries, securities issued or guaranteed by the national
government or national bank, bank deposits, and short-term debt instruments.
While the threshold, or beginning point, for applicability of the special require-
ments may be defined in various ways, one approach would be to subject a
company to those requirements if the fair value of its investment securities were
to exceed 40 per cent of the value of the company's total assets. This calculation
should be made monthly or quarterly. Since it may be difficult for the regulatory
authority to be aware of the asset composition of every company, each company
40. A major regulatory difference would relate to the pricing of securities. As noted, securities
of closed-end funds trade on the market whereas those of open-end funds are sold and redeemed at
net asset value.
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itself should bear the responsibility to ascertain at the end of each period whether
its investment securities have exceeded the 40 per cent limit. Any such company
should be subject to at least two requirements in addition to the customary require-
ments for ordinary business entities. First, it should be required to publish quar-
terly, or even monthly, the fair value of its investment securities. Second, it should
be subject to the same restrictions as are investment funds on transactions with
related, or affiliated, parties."'
E. ENFORCEMENT OF REGULATION
A regulatory statute will not be effective unless it can be enforced. Thus, any
law regulating investment funds must provide remedies for those who are harmed
and penalties for those responsible for the harm. Since enforcement and remedies
pertaining to securities law violations generally will apply to similar violations
concerning investment funds, reference should be made to the Concept Paper on
Securities Regulation. As to specific violations of the investment fund statute that
are not covered under other securities laws, the regulatory authority must be
given the power to bring legal proceedings, to impose monetary penalties, and to
suspend or even prohibit persons from serving or managing investment funds,
depending on the seriousness of the violation. As with other securities laws, a
decision must be made whether to give fund security holders themselves the
right to sue the fund management for wrongdoing. The alternative would be a
requirement that security holders bring the matter to the attention of the regulatory
authority, who would then take legal action, if deemed appropriate. 42 In addition,
the statute must give the government authority to bring criminal actions for serious
wrongdoing, such as fraud, theft, and embezzlement.
41. At what point the special requirements should apply is an issue that must be settled. One
approach would be to require compliance if the 40 per cent limit is exceeded for two consecutive
reporting periods. The requirement could be removed thereafter only if investment securities were
to fall below 40 per cent for two consecutive reporting periods.
42. See the discussion in the Concept Paper on Securities Regulation pertaining to legal actions
by security holders (paragraph 3.d.).
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